Party Foul: How Political Identity Shapes Anti-Semitism

Abstract

Anti-Semitism is a historical and moral term; one loaded with perceptions and prejudices. Called the “longest hatred,” this term has been used throughout history to describe attempts by Christians and others to commit violence against Jews because of their religion.Recent research has shown an increase in anti-Semitism due to its prevalence in conservative and progressive media outlets (Becker, 2020). The term seems to be a catch-all for Pro-Palestine protests, white supremacy, and outright hate speech. The definition also seems to change as you shift from conservative rhetoric to progressive rhetoric. How does one’s political party affect one’s likelihood to commit anti-Semitism?  This study tracks the relationship between political party and opinions of Jewish individuals, acting under the assumption that those with more negative perceptions of Jewish individuals will be more likely to commit anti-Semitism. My initial hypothesis was that Democrats would be more supportive of Jewish individuals due to the polarization induced by Trump in his policy towards Israel. I analyzed a general 2019 Roper Survey asking over 10,000 respondents their opinion from 1-100 on a variety of religious groups. In my cross-sectional design, the dependent variable was that measure of support, with extreme results coded as within 20 of 1 and 100. The main independent variable used in the study was the respondent’s self-identification with a political party, choosing between Republican, Democrat, Independent and Other. Cases were analyzed using both an ANOVA design and a difference of means, culminating in a linear regression. The hypothesis was supported in the regression, showing that Democrats supported Jewish individuals significantly more than Republicans with all else held constant. The results had a p-value of .001, deeming it statistically significant using the standard benchmark of .05. My findings supported previous research done in the early 2000s, but could change in the future as the political environment does.

Introduction

In 2019, President Trump issued an Executive Order on Combating Anti-Semitism. This extended the protections under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to Jews, issued in response to the BDS (Boycott, Divest, Sanction) movement taking place on college campuses. The response to this order was entirely divided, showing two things. Firstly, anti-Semitism is seen as a major problem for not only Jewish Americans but others across the spectrum. Somewhere between 50 to 80 percent of Jews in America have experienced some anti-Semitism in their lifetimes (Tobin, 1998). Much of this anti-Semitism occurs to the young, and to those with a greater sense of Jewish identification (Rebhun, 2013). Secondly, many have discussed and pointed fingers at others for this rise in anti-Semitism. Who is ultimately responsible, the political left with the BDS movement or the political right with the rise in white suprematist hate speech and acts of violence? (Becker, 2020).

Anti-Semitism is ultimately perpetuated by individuals. Many people don’t like to identify as antisemites simply because of Hitler’s genocide being the seeming standard. (Halpern, 1981). The term itself is an emotional one, packed with historical meaning and modern significance. Today, the term seems to have been attached to any criticism of Israel, due to work from the RJC (Republican Jewish Coalition) financed by billionaire Sheldon Adelson (Weisberg, 2014). In the 2012 election, Jewish Republicans repeatedly villainized Barack Obama for his policy towards Israel, despite most Jewish voters being longtime Democrats. Obama still carried the Jewish vote, but many switched to Romney because of this RJC ad campaign. Movements since, such as the BDS movement starting in 2018 have tightened the relationship between Israel policy and the perception of anti-Semitism. Both movements stated above are political ones, each with a base in both the Republican extreme and Democratic extreme. I aim to shed light on the blame game taking place between the two major political parties and focus on how party identification manifests in opinion of Jewish individuals. With the recent conflict in Gaza, this partisan divide on Israel policy is at an all-time high, making this research the more important. How does which party one votes for affects their views of Jewish individuals? How does one’s policy towards Israel shape their likelihood to be anti-Semitic, or to perceive anti-Semitism? The answers could point to a wider political divide between Jewish and not and provide some clarity on anti-Semitism’s rise in the United States.

Theory & Literature Review

Perception in the Camp

How does Party ID of American Jewish adults affect their perceptions of antisemitism? Many studies focus on antisemitism in the United States and the external factors causing it, but few focus on the factors affecting perceptions of antisemitism among Jewish individuals. There are many demographic characteristics that directly affect perceptions of antisemitism such as income, level of religious adherence, party identification, gender and age (Weisberg 2014). I’m focusing simply on party identification.

Two schools of thought exist when focused on party identification; one being that Democratically voting Jewish adults will be more likely to perceive antisemitism because they are more likely to be sensitive to racial and ethnic stereotyping. The opposing theory poses that Republicans among Jewish adults will perceive more antisemitism due to their political alignment with Israel (Rebhun, 2013).

Jewish adults have voted decidedly Democratic since the 50s, but changed in 2012 (Weisberg, 2014). The presidency of Obama was slammed by Republican Jews over his policy towards Israel, with Romney gaining many supporters. This is not indicative of history, as policy towards Israel has not greatly influenced the Jewish vote before 2012. Policy towards Israel is a product of Jewish denomination, as Orthodox Jews greatly support Israel and Reform Jews are “critical” of it (Weisberg, 2014). Similarly, Orthodox Jews are 77% Republican, and Reform Jews are 82% Democratic.

Outside of Jewish vote, definitions of antisemitism differ among individuals (Wright et al., 2022). Many Republicans perceive antisemitism as inherently anti-Israel (Rebhun, 2014). This aligns with the data that Orthodox and Conservative Jews perceive it more, on average (Rebhun, 2014). Criticism of Israel is a huge issue among young liberals, providing strength for this hypothesis. Moreover, Democratically-voting states are more often characterized by strong anti-Jewish attitudes due to criticism of Israel (Rebhun, 2014).

Antisemitism is also perceived higher when within a Jewish community (Kremelberg, 2016). This is because antisemitism is decidedly a national issue rather than a regional one. Antisemitism rarely differs across region, despite changing with a number of other social demographics (Kremelberg, 2016). This supports again the hypothesis that Republican Jews are more likely to perceive antisemitism, with the national issue of Israel policy being at the core.

Moving forward from 2012, perceptions of antisemitism are steadily rising. Many scholars suggest that it is due to the Trump Administration’s handling of antisemitism (Becker 2020), restricting free speech of anything deemed antisemitic. Trump, a very polarizing candidate to especially younger Democrats, has been extremely supportive of Israel throughout his two terms. The Trump administration’s handling of Israel led to the BDS movement, sparking a range of protests and movements across college campuses. The Israel v. Palestine movement has also sparked much debate on college campuses, such as the right to protest and the line between free speech and antisemitism. This is directly correlated with the rising number of perceptions of antisemitism, with many liberal news outlets adopting long-standing Jewish stereotypes such as dual loyalty (Becker, 2020).

A preponderance of data seems to suggest that Republican Jewish adults are more likely to perceive antisemitism than Democratic Jewish adults. This is because antisemitism is not a regional issue, it is a national one, one predominantly focused on Israel policy rather than a racial or ethnic stereotype. Views on Israel and free speech differs wildly among American Jews, with religious denomination and party identification playing a huge role.

Perpetuation Outside The Camp

Antisemitism is most seen by non-Jews as a term thrown around by political parties in the media or online. It has turned entirely into a political tool, which dilutes the history and power of the term. This promotes the ability for viewers to view it the same as misinformation, dropping any hint of moral fiber from the term itself. If antisemitism is fake news, then it can be ignored. Studies show that as anti-Semitic terms are used more in media, perceptions of anti-Semitism among American Jews increase (Rebhun, 2013). On college campuses, anti-Semitism for some is a description of their everyday life, and for others it is an attack upon Palestinian lives. At Columbia University, both Jewish and Muslim students felt uncomfortable there, because tensions were so high. (Levi, 2024). Due to this prevalence within the speak of political parties, anti-Semitism in 2025 is entirely tied to Israel policy in public opinion. This is indicative of a wider culture war online, as those who support Palestine are instantly deemed anti-Semitic by some, just as those who support Israel are instantly deemed progenitors of apartheid by others.

This sort of distinction is currently playing out across college campuses. Anti-Semitism has been almost the scapegoat used to progress Trump’s conservative war against progressive ideology in education. (Levi, 2024). Conservatives want voters to only think of anti-Semitism in criticism of Israel and Israel’s future in Gaza, because that’s a fight they can win. Trump’s unflagging support of Israel deems him a staunch defender of Jewish voters with this view and characterizes anyone who opposes him anti-Semitic. Liberals, similarly, want voters to only think of anti-Semitism as a form of racism and white supremacy. Trump is the same president who saw hundreds of armed people chanting “Jews will not replace us” in 2019 and tweeted that there were “very fine people on both sides.” Conservative anti-Semitism is a Columbia campus in uproar. Liberal anti-Semitism is a Charlottesville rally.  

Hypotheses

Within my sample of American individuals, I expect that Democrats hold a higher view of Jews than Republicans, due to Trump’s policy on Israel. This finding would be in line with recent studies concerning party identification of Jewish individuals (Weisberg, 2014), as well as studies concerning polarization among non-Jews in the wake of the Trump administration (Becker, 2020). It would be reasonable to assume this even as more Jewish individuals flock to the Republican party due to its unwavering support of Israel in foreign affairs, because it alienates those who are “critical” of Israel (Weisberg, 2014).  

Data & Methods

 This 2019 Roper survey asks American adults how they feel towards several groups with 0 being as cold and negative as possible and with 100 being as warm and positive as possible. The survey also includes various demographic questions, several of which I’ve used to further analyze results. The Jewish variable is interval as it is a direct number (1-100) and is my dependent variable. According to Table 1, the mean across all 10,777 respondents was 63.42, which was a good bit higher than I had anticipated. The standard deviation is also significant, measuring the array of responses. Many responses were extreme, or did not adhere entirely to the mean.

Table 1

Variable

N

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Standard Deviation

Feeling towards Jews

10777

0

100

63.42

26.268

Party identification among Roper respondents was my main independent variable. It is a nominal variable as one could possibly select Republican, Democrat, Independent, or Other. I converted this variable to a set of dummy variables concerning each party. Looking at Table 2, 32.3% of respondents identified as Democrat, as opposed to 25.7% of Republicans. A huge 28.4% identified as Independents, and 13.5% claimed another political party their home. The sample then, is not entirely representative of the wider American population, as it samples many more Democrats than Republicans, and even more Independents than Republicans.

Table 2

Variable

Frequency

Percent

Republican

2786

25.7

Democrat

3501

32.3

Independent

3078

28.4

Something Else

1464

13.5

Total

10830

100.0

My first control variable is age, which is an ordinal variable. The values are broken up from 18-29 to 30-49 to 50-64 to 64+. Glancing at Table 3, 33.7% of respondents were 30-49, with 26.1% being 50-64. This means that most of the survey respondents are middle-aged, with 18-29 and 65+ both only garnering a bit over 20 percent. Age is an important variable to consider here because the definition of anti-Semitism is different among generations. Among the younger, it is viewed as a form of racism or ethnic hatred, while among the older it is directly connected to Israel policy and post-WWII politics (Rebhun, 2013).

Table 3

Variable

Frequency

Percent

18-29

2198

20.1

30-49

3692

33.7

50-64

2860

26.1

65+

2209

20.2

Total

10960

100.0

The second control variable I used is sex. This is a nominal variable where respondents chose between their biological sexes assigned at birth, male and female. I converted this into two dummy variables in anticipation of a linear regression. One can see from Table 4 that 52.2% of these respondents were female, leaving 47.8% as male. These distinctions are helpful when considering how much biological sex and gender identity play into politics, and therefore into Israel policy.

Table 4

Variable

Frequency

Percent

Male

5239

47.8

Female

5722

52.2

Total

10961

100.0

The third control variable I used is race/ethnicity. This is a nominal variable where respondents chose between white (non-Hispanic), Hispanic, black, or other. Each race I separately coded as a dummy variable, again in anticipation of a regression. Judging from Table 65 respondents here were 64.7% white, which does not provide for a very representative sample. More Hispanic and Black voters would allow for a more representative sample here, especially one more generalizable to the entirety of the US. The ethnicity of Asian was also not included in the responses, I believe accounting for the 8.1% of Other respondents. Race is crucial to the analysis because of how much it plays into party identification. Racial groups tend to exhibit voting trends over time within one party or another, and this data will connect that with party identification.

Table 5

Variable

Frequency

Percent

White non-Hispanic

7001

64.7

Black non-Hispanic

1285

11.9

Hispanic

1652

15.3

Other

880

8.1

Total

10817

100.0

The fourth control variable I used is marital status. This is another nominal variable, with respondents choosing varying degrees of marital status. These were again coded as dummy variables for a future regression. From Table 6, one can see that 50.3% of these respondents are currently married, while 21.8% have never been married. These data chalk how marital status relates to anti-Semitism. Likely, if one is married, they are more likely to be set in their political beliefs. This has huge implications when considering Israel policy and anti-Semitism among parties.

Table 6

Variable

Frequency

Percent

Married

5505

50.3

Living with a partner

1150

10.5

Divorced

1112

10.2

Separated

280

2.6

Widowed

504

4.6

Never been married

2385

21.8

Total

10935

100.0

The fifth control variable I used is religion. Religion is yet another nominal variable with respondents choosing from many religions displayed. I created many different dummy variables derived from each religious ideology. Taking from Table 7, 40% of respondents here are Protestant and a large 21.2% adopt no religion in particular. Religion is the most obvious control variable to use here, because much of anti-Semitism is claimed to be religious intolerance (Halpern, 1981). Some religions have histories of being tolerant, and the data here will point to the impact of personal religious beliefs when thinking of anti-Semitism. The data will also show that religion can have a huge impact on Israel foreign policy.

Table 7

Variable

Frequency

Percent

Protestant

4353

40.0

Roman Catholic

1936

17.8

Mormon

137

1.3

Orthodox

47

.4

Jewish

180

1.7

Muslim

84

.8

Buddhist

73

.7

Hindu

71

.7

Atheist

727

6.7

Agnostic

733

6.7

Something Else

235

2.2

Nothing

2312

21.2

Total

10889

100.0

Results

Bivariate Analysis

Because my dependent variable was coded as interval and my main independent variable was coded as nominal, ANOVA was used to determine the relationship between the two. Table 8 displays that one-way ANOVA I performed using party identification as the independent variable and views of Jews as the dependent variable. One can see from Table 9 that the mean view of Jews for Republicans is over 4 units higher than Democrats. This view is a good 7 points higher than Independents and 10 points higher than the political extremes houses in other parties. One can also see the standard deviation increase from respondents who identified as Republicans to those who did as Something Else. More and more responses enter extreme territories (within 20 of 0 and 100), judging from this data.

Table 8

Variable

N

Mean

Std. Deviation

Std. Error

Republican

2727

68.18

26.081

.499

Democrat

3459

64.05

25.737

.438

Independent

3036

61.1

25.541

.464

Something Else

1447

58.36

27.833

.732

Total

10669

63.5

26.269

.254

Centering on this difference in Republican means from the rest of the data, I conducted a Difference of Means analysis by separating Republicans from the party identification variable and making it into a dummy variable. The Republican mean still rests at 68.18, but the non-Republican mean falls to 61.89, over 6 units lower. This means the average Republican view of Jews is over 4 units over the average of all respondents found in Table 1 (63.42), with non-Republicans being around 1.5 units lower.

Table 9

Variable

N

Mean

Std. Deviation

Std. Error Mean

Not Republican

7942

61.89

26.141

.293

Republican

2727

68.18

26.081

.499

Multivariate Analysis

To further test the interaction between my independent and dependent variables, I performed a linear regression. My dependent variable is coded as interval, so a linear regression was needed. My independent variables were all nominal to begin, then split into separate dummy variables. For my comparison group, I selected the 30–49-year-old male, white, married Protestant Republican as my comparison group. The results are displayed in Table 10, with each Beta constant being simply that variable’s relationship to the dependent compared with the comparison group. Holding all other variables constant, Democrats are actually more likely to have stronger feelings towards Jews than Republicans. The positive beta coefficient is statistically significant with a p-value of .023, below the .05 alpha level set for all data. I reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between the two variables. My analysis suggests that there is a significant relationship between party identification and views on Jewish individuals, which is in line with the politics surrounding Israel in the United States. Respondents identifying as politically Independent were significantly less supportive of Jewish people on average compared to Republicans. A probable explanation for this is the identification of extremist parties such as Libertarian or Green within the Independent category, both of which hold radical and isolated social views.

Table 10

Variable

B

Std. Error

Significance

Constant

66.647

.725

<.001

Democrat

1.449

.636

.023

Independent

-2.673

.620

<.001

18-29

-.840

.763

.271

50-64

2.010

.669

.003

65+

5.356

.082

<.001

Female

1.351

.513

.008

Black

-6.694

.873

<.001

Hispanic

-6.258

.772

<.001

Other Race

-5.412

.996

<.001

Living with partner

-3.203

.879

<.001

Divorced

-3.062

.867

<.001

Separated

-1.446

1.618

.372

Widowed

-1.685

1.249

.177

Never married

.417

.738

.572

Roman Catholic

-1.241

.747

.096

Mormon

2.613

2.240

.244

Orthodox

-3.795

3.781

.315

Jewish

14.171

1.971

<.001

Muslim

-4.526

2.992

.130

Buddhist

-1.820

3.304

.549

Hindu

2.855

3.173

.368

Atheist

-7.660

1.082

<.001

Agnostic

-1.244

1.069

.245

Something Else

-4.422

1.731

.011

Nothing in Particular

-6.633

.695

<.001

Some control variables seem to be in-line with my research, and some act out. Many within the religion variable did not achieve statistical significance, perhaps due to the smallness of the sample size. Outside of religion, most variables achieved a p-value of below .05, deeming a significant relationship. Looking at age, a significant relationship was not found within the 18-29 group, but sentiment increased as respondents increased in age. With all other variables constant, older voters were much more supportive of Jewish individuals than younger, especially those over 65. This tracks with prior research, as many of those respondents either fought or had parents who fought in WWII and can remember the tragedy of the Holocaust firsthand (Levi, 2024). Again, in agreement with previous research, females were more supportive of Jewish individuals than males (Rebhun, 2013).

The race variable is interesting here. Per Becker’s research, Black individuals often garner very high perceptions of anti-Semitism from American Jews, and that is reflected well in the table (Becker, 2020). One of the strongest relationships displayed, Black respondents supported Jews nearly 7 points less than white individuals, with Hispanic respondents also supporting 6 points less. Whether this divide is ethnic or religious, one cannot really tell. Black and Hispanic individuals typically vote for the Democratic Party (not every year!), but in 2020, Trump carried both groups. Where is that support for Israel here? In his 2024 presidency, Trump is even more vehement in his support for Israel, attacking protestors on college campuses across the nation. I would be very interested to see those results now.

When glancing at marital status, those divorced or living with a partner hold very negative views of Jewish individuals as well as compared to those married. Those living with a partner are more likely to be younger, more Democratic respondents, which I believe explains this relationship. Divorced individuals might also be more jaded in their worldview, and not as inclusive as their married counterparts. Lastly, the religious variables were full of insignificant relationships, which means something. This is not a religious decision. Many individuals are not comparing their religion to Judaism and deriving a conclusion about the wide body of people. Jewish individuals more 14 points more supportive of Jews than Protestants, which is the easiest conclusion to make in this analysis. Interestingly though, those identifying as atheist and not being religious in at all showed significantly less support for Jews than Protestants, both supporting 7 and 8 points less. Thus, support for Jewish individuals is only a religious decision if respondents are Jewish, atheist, or not religious. That seems a bit ironic. 

Discussion and Conclusion

            The 2019 Roper study was a fairly recent one, taken in the midst of Trump’s first term and the height of the BDS movement. A more recent survey I believe would show similar results for my main analysis, with perhaps some variation among the controls, as previously stated. Many studies I had seen used three surveys conducted by RJC, J Street, and the Pew Center around the year 2000 and 2001 (Kremelberg & Dashefsky, 2013). These are very useful, but so much has changed within the political landscape of this country since that a more recent survey was needed. A potential drawback to my study was the lack of questions concerning Israel in the survey design. That would provide a much more discernible relationship between party identification and Israel policy, but the question would have to be worded as to reduce confusion among respondents. Also, the conclusion that negative views of Jewish individuals constitute anti-Semitism is not an entirely unreasonable one but cannot be supported by direct data. I guess one could measure anti-Semitic incidents and perpetrators, but that would be unreliable and tedious. This analysis is ultimately acting under the assumption that those who hold more negative views of Jewish individuals are therefore more likely to commit acts of anti-Semitism. These can be anything from white suprematist rallies to hate speech.

            My analysis showed that, on average, Democrats hold higher views of Jewish individuals than Republicans with all else held constant. This supports Rebhun’s analysis that Democrats are more likely than Republicans to view anti-Semitism as a problem, among Jews. Without these variables being controlled, Republicans seem to support Jewish individuals much more than others, but that is not true. Younger respondents hold much more negative views of Jews compared to older generations, displaying the deployment of anti-Semitism as an attack on free speech on college campuses. This is also indicative of the high proportion of younger Jews having experienced anti-Semitism as compared to older (Rebhun, 2013.) Females are much more likely to be supportive of Jews than males, and are more likely to view anti-Semitism as a problem (Rebhun, 2013). Also in line with research, Black and Hispanic respondents were much less supportive of Jews than white respondents (Becker, 2020). These results would be more interesting to see following the 2024 election, as many of these voters now find themselves in the Republican party. My analysis would change if simply tracking race and political party, which interact in very interesting ways, such as seen above. Religion does not seem to really influence views on anti-Semitism, as the only instances where it does are for Jews, atheists, and the non-religious. The latter two groups adopting so negative views of Jewish individuals is concerning, and indicative of a wider intolerance among those not espousing a religion. Often anti-Semitism is viewed as a product of either Christianity or Islam, but both did not have a significant relationship here (Halpern, 1981). Many vast assumptions about anti-Semitism are not reflected in this analysis, as it seems as if political party shapes the reality of opinion of Jewish individuals. More studies concerning political party and anti-Semitism would be interesting to see in the midst of Trump’s second term as president. Much has changed just since 2019, and this updated survey could provide a lot of insight into the complexities of this relationship. Further studies could also explore the prevalence of anti-Semitic terms in politicized media, and compare it with perceptions, similar to Rebhun’s 2013 study.  

References

Becker, Amy B. 2020. “Polarization and American Jews: The Partisan Debate Over Attribution of Blame and Responsibility for Rising Anti‐Semitism in the United States.” Social Science Quarterly 101: 1572–83.

Halpern, Ben. 1981. “What Is Antisemitism?” Modern Judaism 1 (3): 251–62. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1396247.

Kremelberg, David, and Arnold Dashefsky. 2016. “Targets of Out-Group Hostility in the Contemporary United States: Individual- and Community-Level Factors Associated with the Experience of Anti-Semitism Among American Jews.” Contemporary Jewry 36: 243–64. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12397-016-9173-6.

Levi, Lili. 2024. “Politicizing Antisemitism amidst Today's Educational Culture Wars.” Lewis & Clark Law Review 27: 1185–1234.

Rebhun, Uzi. 2014. “Correlates of Experiences and Perceptions of Anti-Semitism Among Jews in the United States.” Social Science Research 47: 44–60. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2014.03.007.

Weisberg, Herbert F. 2014. “Tradition! Tradition? Jewish Voting in the 2012 Election.” PS: Political Science and Politics 47 (3): 629–35. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43284611.

Wright, Graham, Sasha Volodarsky, Shahar Hecht, and Leonard Saxe. 2022. “Antisemitism and Polarization: The Political Dynamics of American Jewish Concerns about Traditional and Israel-Related Antisemitism.” Politics, Groups, and Identities 12 (2): 457–75. doi:10.1080/21565503.2022.2144391.